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Since the inception of several employment and discrimination statutes,
arbitration has grown exponentially as an alternative for the adjudication of
employment disputes.1 The reason for this has largely been due to the explo-
sion in employment claims arising from violations of these statutes.' Regard-
ing these disputes, the Supreme Court has traditionally held that statutory
claims are indeed arbitrable pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement3 under
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 4
In an effort to end employment discrimination based on "race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin,"' 5 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VIi").6 In order to adequately effect this calling, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") was created as the Act's pri-
mary enforcement mechanism.7 As a general rule, there have never been limi-
* B.A., Calvin College, 2000; J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law, 2003.
1. Beth M. Primm, A Critical Look At The EEOC's Policy Against Mandatory Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 151, 151 (Spring 1999). See also Ju-
lie L. Waters, Does The Battle Over Mandatory Arbitration Jeopardize The EEOC's War In
Fighting Workplace Discrimination?, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2000) (stating that requir-
ing employees to sign binding arbitration agreements are popular alternatives to adjudication).
Such statutes pertinent to this discussion are the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII").
2. Id. "Employment litigation has grown at a rate many times greater than litigation in
general .... almost one thousand percent greater that the increase in all other types of civil liti-
gation combined." Id. (quoting Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal And Practical Implications Of ADR And
Arbitration In Employment Disputes, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 247, 248 (1993)).
3. Infra notes 40-69 and accompanying text.
4. 9 U.S.C. § I et seq. (2003).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (mandating that no employer shall hire or fire, or otherwise
discriminate against an individual in any way, to adversely affect their employment under Title
VII).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994). See also H.R. Doc. No. 88-914 (II), at 15 (1964) (stat-
1
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tations placed on the powers of the EEOC.8 However, while arbitration
agreements under the FAA and the enforcement powers of the EEOC have
been adequately examined separately by the Supreme Court, the issue of how
the two directly effect one other had yet to be addressed.
As a result of the Court's lack of direction concerning the above-
mentioned issue, lower courts that have been presented with the problem have
found for different results.9 Thus, when an employee who had signed a prior
arbitration agreement was fired by a Waffle House franchise in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Supreme Court took the
opportunity to decide exactly how the EEOC factored into the equation.'0
This Casenote will analyze the Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc."1 and how it may ultimately effect employers and their use
of arbitration agreements. Part II will discuss the evolution of the Court's rea-
soning regarding both the EEOC and FAA." Part III discusses the facts of the
case, 3 while Part IV will analyze the opinions of the Justices. 4 In Part V, I
will examine the impact of the Court's decision and the effect it may have on
the arbitration of statutory claims. 5 Finally, Part VI will conclude this Case-
note with some thoughts regarding the Court's decision. 6
II. THE HISTORIES OF THE FAA AND THE EEOC
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 7
The FAA was created with the explicit intent of initiating a federal pol-
icy that found arbitration to be an acceptable forum for the resolution of
ing Congress' intent was to grant the EEOC full responsibility for enforcing Title VII through
private actions brought in federal court).
8. lnfra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
9. The issue has largely been confined to what damages may be sought in which forum.
Compare EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Craft's, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir., 1999) (EEOC's inde-
pendent statutory authority to bring action against employer for injunctive relief and monetary
damages in federal court not affected by employee signing arbitration agreement) with EEOC v.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2nd Cir. 1998) (allowing EEOC to bring action in federal
court for injunctive relief, but precluding them from bringing monetary damages claim) Infra
notes 112-147.
10. Infra notes 149-257 and accompanying text for facts and analysis of the Waffle House
decision.
11. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
12. Infra notes 17-148 and accompanying text.
13. Infra notes 149-168 and accompanying text.
14. Infra notes 169-257 and accompanying text.
15. lnfra notes 258-271 and accompanying text.
16. Infra notes 272-273 and accompanying text.
17. 9 U.S.C. § I et seq. (2003).
2
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claims. 8 The Supreme Court eventually echoed this sentiment, stating that the
purpose behind the FAA was to "reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements . . . and to place [them] on the same footing as other
contracts."' 19 Thus, with the inception of the FAA, Congress sought to effect
the prejudice felt by courts towards arbitration. However, the Court's initial
treatment of arbitration clauses formed under the FAA was less than
amicable.
1. Wilko v. Swan 0
While Congress' purpose behind the enactment of the FAA was seem-
ingly clear, the Court was slow to react in a manner reflecting this intent. In
the 1953 case Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court was faced with a case in-
volving a buyer of securities who had sued the seller claiming fraud in viola-
tion of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.21 Although a signed arbi-
tration agreement existed, the Court held that the buyer could not be
compelled to arbitrate his claim.2 2 It based its decision on the belief that the
substantive rights afforded by the statute would be thwarted if the Court al-
lowed a restriction as to the forum.2 3 In response to this holding, lower courts
found that arbitration agreements involving statutory rights were largely
voidable. 24
18. Pursuant to section two of the FAA, written arbitration agreements "shall be valid, ir-
revocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." Id. at § 2.
19. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
20. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994).
22. Swan, 346 U.S. at 438.
23. Id. at 437-438.
24. Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L.
REv. 1, 11 (1999) (citing Richard G. Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolu-
tion: Reflections on Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 397, 404
(1988); Michael G. Holcomb, Note, The Demise of the FAA's "Contract of Employment" Excep-
tion?, 1992 J. Disp. RESOL. 213, 216 (1992)). This idea was based on three theories: "(I) courts
could enforce statutory rights better than arbitrators; (2) it contravened public policy to permit a
party to waive her statutory right to a judicial forum by signing a predispute arbitration agree-
ment; and (3) the informality of arbitration made it difficult for courts to correct arbitral errors in
statutory interpretation." Bales, supra note 25, at I I (citing American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968)).
3
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2. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.25
Twenty-one years after the Wilko decision, the Supreme Court introduced
a line of cases which addressed the arbitrability of civil rights actions brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 In Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver, the Court held that a union employee could not be compelled to arbi-
trate his Title VII claim, even though he had signed an arbitration clause as
part of a collective-bargaining agreement. 27 Inherent in the decision was the
aforementioned hostility felt for arbitration.28
In Gardner-Denver, the Court considered whether "an employee's statu-
tory right to a trial de novo under Title VII may be foreclosed by prior sub-
mission of his claim to final arbitration under the non discrimination clause
of a collective bargaining agreement."2 9 In support of its holding, the Court
stated that the federal courts were granted the ultimate enforcement responsi-
bility over Title VII claims,30 and, as a result, private parties played a less
significant role in the actual enforcement of the statute.3' Furthermore, there
was no suggestion in Title VII that a prior arbitral decision precluded the in-
dividual claimant from pursuing his claim in federal court.3 2 The Court con-
cluded, after its examination of Title VII, that Congress intended it to "sup-
plement rather than supplant" existing statutes regarding employment
discrimination.33
Additionally, a union could not waive an employee's rights under Title
VII. 34 If it could, it "would defeat the paramount congressional purpose be-
hind Title VII."3 The Court reasoned that claims brought under Title VII
were different than those brought under a collective-bargaining agreement.
36
While rights under a collective-bargaining agreement were conferred for the
economic benefit of all union members, Title VII claims concerned an indi-
25. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
26. Supra note 6.
27. Id. at 38.
28. Colin P. Johnson, Has Arbitration Become A Wolf In Sheep's Clothing?: A Comment
Exploring The Incompatibility Between Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements In Em-
ployment Contracts And Statutorily Created Rights, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 511, 517 (2000).
29. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 38.
30. Id. at 45.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 47.
33. Id. at 48-49.
34. Id. at 51.
35. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51.
36. Id.
4
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vidual's right to equal employment opportunities.37 Finally, the Court found
problematic the lack of structural competence of the arbitral process to re-
solve discrimination claims. 35 Thus, the Court held that one does not forfeit
his private cause of action under Title VII due to the signing of a prior arbi-
tration agreement.
3 9
3. A Shift in Precedent: The Mitsubishi Trilogy4°
While the Court had refused to compel arbitration in Title VII cases, it
was beginning to move towards the implementation of a wide-ranging policy
in favor of agreements under the FAA. The beginning shades of this accept-
ance became more pronounced in three consecutive cases, known collectively
as the "Mitsubishi Trilogy."'41 In these cases, the Court enforced arbitrations
arising under antitrust,42 racketeering, 43 and securities laws.44 While it refused
to do so explicitly, the Court essentially overruled Wilko in these decisions.
45
In doing so, the Court performed an about face and created a presumption of
arbitrability under the FAA. 46 Furthermore, this presumption could only be re-
37. Id. In this regard, the Court distinguished between the contractual rights under the col-
lective-bargaining agreement and the statutory rights under Title VII. By filing a claim under the
collective-bargaining agreement, the employee seeks contractual vindication, while filing a claim
under Title VII, an employee asserts an independent claim afforded by Congress. Id. at 50.
38. Id. at 56-59. The Court questioned the arbitrator's ability to preside over statutory
claims as well as a lack of procedural safeguards. These safeguards include a record of the pro-
ceedings, rules of evidence, and the availability of "rights and procedures" which one would
find typical in a civil trial such as discovery and sworn testimony. Id. at 57-58.
39. Id. at 48. The Court specifically stated that one does not forfeit his right to pursue his
private grievance in court, even if he first submits his claim to arbitration. Id.
40. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
41. Bales, supra note 24, at 14.
42. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 640 (compelling arbitration under agreement arising under the
Sherman Antitrust Act).
43. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242 (compelling arbitration under agreement arising under
both RICO and section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934).
44. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 485 (compelling arbitration under agreement arising under sec-
tion 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933).
45. Id. at 480.
46. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. The Court stated:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the court-
5
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butted with a showing of contrary congressional intent by the party opposing
arbitration. 47
Possibly the most influential feature of the Court's decisions in the tril-
ogy was its outright rejection of several criticisms formerly held by the Court
regarding arbitration. First, the fact that an arbitration clause was formed out
of a contract of adhesion was not enough to find it invalid.48 The opposing
party must make a showing of fraud or undue influence to invalidate such an
agreement.4 9 Second, the Court attacked the widely-held belief that arbitration
was a deficient forum for complicated claims.5 0 Finally, because the arbitra-
tors were typically "drawn from the legal as well as the business commu-
nity," fear of incompetence was equally unfounded.5 While the Mitsubishi
trilogy involved statutory rights sufficiently different from those arising under
Title VII and similar statutes, the Court's shift regarding arbitration evidenced
an overall policy shift which would ultimately invade the realm of employ-
ment discrimination.
4. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.52
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Gilmer is considered by some
commentators to be the most important decision involving the mandatory ar-
bitration of statutory claims.5 3 In it, the Court applied its recently expressed
goodwill for arbitration, originally articulated in the Mitsubishi trilogy, 4 to
cases involving anti-discrimination statutes.55 In doing so, it rejected the sub-
stance of Gardner-Denver by compelling a plaintiff's Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") claim to be arbitrated pursuant to a pre-dispute,
mandatory arbitration clause.56
room for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. Id.
47. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
48. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632-33.
49. Id. at 633.
50. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 632 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633-34).
51. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634.
52. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
53. Johnson, supra note 28, at 521. In his article, the author stated, "[Gilmer] is the cap-
stone of an evolving affection the Supreme Court has developed for arbitration and is the water-
shed case in the area of statutory rights and the submission of these rights to arbitration." Id.
(quoting Cole v. Bums International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 at 1467 (1997)).
54. Supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
55. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-
20 n. 6 (1985)).
56. Id. at 34. Gilmer marked the first time the Court applied the strong federal policy fav-
oring arbitration to claims brought under civil rights statutes. As discussed, the Court had earlier
found claims brought under statutes of a different nature to be arbitrable. See supra notes 42-44.
6
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In its decision, the Court reinforced the "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements. ' 57 In doing so, it refuted practically every argument it
had made earlier, in support of its decision in Gardner-Denver. The Court be-
gan its analysis by explaining that arbitration may act as a proper forum for
the resolution of statutory claims, because the rights afforded the resisting
party are identical in arbitration and litigation.58 Furthermore, the Court re-
sisted the common criticisms of the procedural risks that may accompany ar-
bitration, and found it sufficient for the vindication of statutory rights.59
While the Court itself recognized that not all claims were proper for ar-
bitration,60 the burden was on the party seeking to escape arbitration to show
that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statu-
tory rights at issue. 61 Regarding Gilmer's claim, the Court found no such in-
tent to exist under the ADEA.61 Though the Court's holding dealt specifically
with the ADEA, it opened the doors to the arbitration of statutory civil rights
claims generally.63
57. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). Further, the Court stated, "It is by now clear that statu-
tory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA."
Id. at 26.
58. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637). The Court compared
claims brought under the ADEA with earlier claims brought under the Sherman Act, RICO, or
the Securities Act of 1933. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28. It explained that these laws were all designed
to advance "important public policies, but .... are appropriate for arbitration." Id. In doing so,
the Court did away with the largely held belief that arbitration was not a proper forum for the
resolution of statutory claims which served broader public policies, such as civil rights. Thus, the
Court rejected its earlier feeling that formal adjudication alone was capable of furthering the so-
cial purposes with which statutory civil rights claims were created to protect. See supra note 38
and accompanying text.
59. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30. The Court stated that concerns regarding discovery, lack of
public record, and unequal bargaining power were insufficient to invalidate arbitration as a pro-
cess. Id. at 30-31.
60. Id. at 26.
61. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). To establish such an intent, the party must
go to the "text of the [statute], its legislative history," or show an .'inherent conflict' between
arbitration and the [statute's] underlying purposes." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting McMahon,
482 U.S. at 227). Additionally, throughout this inquiry, "questions of arbitrability must be ad-
dressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26
(quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24).
62. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34.
63. John W.R. Murray, The Uncertain Legacy of Gilmer: Mandatory Arbitration of Fed-
eral Employment Discrimination Claims, 26 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 281, 286 (1999). As evidence
to this, several lower courts have applied the Court's holding to Title VII claims. See Koveleskie
7
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In lieu of its holding, the Court recognized the inherent conflict created
by its decisions in Gardner-Denver and Gilmer. In an effort towards resolu-
tion, the Court limited its holding in the former to cases involving collective-
bargaining agreements. 64 It pointed to several important distinctions that it be-
lieved to be relevant. First, Gardner-Denver dealt with whether the arbitration
of contractual claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory
claims, while the Gilmer Court dealt with the enforceability of the arbitration
agreement itself.65 The Court reasoned that because the parties in Gardner-
Denver had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor negoti-
ator did not have the authority to resolve such claims, employees were not
precluded from seeking resolution of statutory claims judicially. 66
The second distinction found by the Court was that the individual's
rights may be subordinate to the collective rights found in a collective-
bargaining agreement. 67 This necessitated the ability of the individual to have
a forum for the vindication of his own rights. Due to there being no collec-
tive-bargaining agreement in Gilmer, this conflict did not exist.
Finally, the Court stated that, unlike Gilmer, Gardner-Denver and its
progeny were not decided under the FAA, which reflected a strong federal
policy favoring arbitration. 68 Thus, the Court's decision in Gilmer adequately
reflected this policy. With these distinctions, the Court felt that it had success-
fully resolved the conflict between Gilmer and Gardner-Denver.69
B. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Throughout the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning the arbitration
of statutory claims, there have been no cases which directly involved the
EEOC.70 While Gilmer briefly commented on the EEOC's authority, the
Court had never been presented with a case which involved both a privately
v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc. 167 E3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146
F.3d 175 (3d. Cir. 1998); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (1lth Cir. 1992);
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
64. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-34.




69. Since Gilmer, practically all lower courts that have been presented with an issue of
arbitrability concerning statutory claims have found for arbitration. However, there have been
several courts which have found that the statutory claim at issue was not proper for arbitration.
Infra note 271.
70. Sarah Baxter, Employees Beware: Signing Arbitration Agreements May Limit Your
Remedies In Suits Filed by the EEOC, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 413, 413 (2000).
8
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signed arbitration agreement and the EEOC as the claimant.7" Thus, until
now, the Court had not had the opportunity to resolve the possible conflict
between the EEOC and the FAA. For this reason, the Court's decision in Waf-
fle House will act as a benchmark for lower courts to follow in regards to the
EEOC's role in conflicts involving arbitration agreements.
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to put an end to
employment discrimination72 on the bases on "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 73 As the primary enforcer of Title VII claims, the EEOC
was created to prosecute employers who violated the statute.7 4 However, the
EEOC has not always possessed the ability to effectively fight discrimination
in the workplace. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC was limited
to the investigation of claims and attempted conciliation of violations, while
Congress relied solely on private parties' suits for enforcement.7 5 If attempts
at conciliation failed, the EEOC's involvement ceased.7 6 Thus, in an effort to
end noncompliance with the statute, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 with the Civil Rights.Act of 1972. 71 In it, Congress created a multi-
step enforcement scheme by which the EEOC would investigate a claim and
ultimately enforce it in federal court.78 Under its revised enforcement scheme,
71. The Gilmer Court did say, however, that an individual claimant under the ADEA who
was bound to an arbitration agreement was still free to file a complaint with the EEOC. Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 28.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (mandating that no employer shall hire or fire, or other-
wise discriminate against an individual in any way, to adversely affect their employment under
Title VII).
73. Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994). See also H.R. Doc. No. 88-914 (II), at 15 (1964) (stat-
ing Congress's intent was to grant the EEOC full responsibility for enforcing Title VII through
private actions brought in federal court). The EEOC's enforcement scheme as part of Title VII
was incorporated by Congress into the ADA at 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994).
75. Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358-59 (1977).
76. Id.
77. General Telephone Co. of the NW v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 325-26 (1980).
78. The procedure begins with the EEOC alleging that an employer has engaged in unlaw-
ful employment practice. Next, a charge must be filed by the EEOC within 180 days and notice
must be served upon the employer within 10 days of filing the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
The EEOC is then required to investigate the charge and determine its merit. This determination
must be made within 120 days from filing the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC
finds reasonable cause of a violation, it "shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Id. If the
EEOC is unable to secure a conciliation agreement, it may bring a civil action against the em-
ployer in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).
229
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the EEOC now possessed the ability to sue employers directly in an effort to
adequately enforce the anti-discrimination laws.7 9
In addition to the EEOC's general enforcement abilities, Congress
granted the Commission the remedy of monetary damages in and effort to aid
its enforcement. 80 Included were back-pay 8' and compensatory and punitive
damages. 82 The sole purpose behind these remedies, which were modeled on
the back-pay provision of the National Labor Relations Act,83 was to "render
a decree, which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of
the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future. ' 84 Thus, the ability to
seek monetary damages had been determined to greatly aid in the EEOC's
enforcement procedures, due to their compensatory and deterrent effects.
With the inception of the EEOC came its involvement in the resolution
of employment discrimination claims. An important issue that accompanied
this event was whether the EEOC was subject to the same rules and limita-
tions that bound the individual claimant.. The Court's general response to this
question was no. Its decisions in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC85
and General Telephone Co. of the NW v. EEOC6 reflected this sentiment.
1. Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC87
In Occidental, the EEOC brought an action against the insurance com-
pany, alleging violations of Title VII for sexually discriminatory employment
practices. 88 The charges were brought approximately three years and two
months after the employee had complained to the EEOC.89 The District Court
granted Occidental's summary judgment motion, on the grounds that the
EEOC has only 180 days to file a charge against an employer in federal
court. Further, the Court stated that the Commission was subject to the state
79. Bales, supra note 24, at 7.
80. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5-f(g)(l) (2001).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(2) (2001).
83. Moody, 422 U.S. at 419. Under the Act, "making the worker whole for losses suffered
on account of an unfair labor practice is part of the vindication of the public policy which the
Board enforces." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941). Thus, due to the ex-
press similarities between the two provisions, the purpose behind both provisions is similar, if
not identical. Moody, 422 U.S. at 419.
84. Id. at 418. (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
85. Infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
86. Infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
87. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
88. Id. at 357-58.
89. Id. at 358.
10
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limitations period of one year.90 The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that fed-
eral law did not impose a 180 day period on the EEOC, and that the Com-
mission was not bound by any state statute of limitations. 9' The Supreme
Court affirmed.92
In its decision, the Court cited to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, which established the EEOC's ultimate authority to bring an ac-
tion in federal court.93 Under the 1972 Act, the only time limitation imposed
on the EEOC was a 30 day period after the charge was filed where the
EEOC could not commence judicial action. 94 The 180 day period in the stat-
ute referred to a time table in which the EEOC retained exclusive jurisdiction
over the charge.95 As such, it did not constitute a statute of limitations.
Next, the Court responded to the state statute of limitations claim.96 In
deciding that one does not apply to the EEOC, the Court stated that Congress
envisioned the EEOC to bring an action in federal court only after it had
"discharged its administrative duties. ' '9 7 As one might imagine, these duties
took time, and the Court believed it would not be appropriate to have the
EEOC rely on state statutes of limitations for guidance. 9 Additionally, the
Court relied on congressional debates in which members of both Houses ex-
hibited open concem about the back log which plagued the EEOC. 9  Thus,




92. Id. at 355.
93. For a detailed look at the EEOC's multi-layered approach to enforcement, see supra
note 78.
94. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 360. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)).
95. Id. at 361. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)).
96. Id. at 366.
97. Id. at 368. These duties include the opportunity to "settle disputes through conference,
conciliation, and persuasion .... " as well as investigating the claim. Id.
98. Id. The Court believed that under some circumstances, a state statute of limitations pe-
riod may directly conflict with Congress' requirement that the EEOC fulfill these administrative
duties. Id.
99. Id. at 369.
100. Id. at 370.
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2. General Telephone Co. of the NW v. EEOC °'
In its decision in General Telephone, the Supreme Court stated that the
EEOC's purpose was to 'prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful
practice' as set forth in Title VII."10 2 In General Telephone, the EEOC re-
ceived complaints of sexual discrimination from four General Telephone em-
ployees. 0 3 After it investigated, the EEOC found reasonable cause to suspect
the discrimination being claimed and subsequently filed suit against General
Telephone. 0 4 The complaint alleged discrimination against females in the
company's facilities in California, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon. 05 General
Telephone moved to dismiss the claim due to the EEOC's failure to certify
the women as a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 106
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the Rule 23 certification require-
ments did not apply to the EEOC. 0 7 It did so because the Commission was
proceeding in its own name, pursuant to its statutory authority, and not on be-
half of the women.1' 8 While the effective enforcement of private rights was
one goal with which the EEOC was created, 09 it was not the only goal. The
primary goal of Congress in creating the EEOC was to more effectively vin-
dicate the public interest. 10 Thus, the Supreme Court found in General Tele-
phone that the EEOC possessed the independent authority to investigate
claims and enforce Title VII both as a representative of the individual plain-
tiff, and as a vehicle for the public interest.
When applying the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the EEOC's
authority over employment discrimination claims, practically every circuit re-
flected these prior holdings."' Thus, judicial response was seemingly clear
101. 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
102. Id. at 318.
103. Id. at 320.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 321. The discrimination included restrictions on maternity leave, access to craft
jobs, and promotion to managerial positions. The EEOC sought injunctive relief and back pay. Id.
106. Id. at 321-22.
107. General Telephone, 446 U.S. at 333-34.
108. Id. at 324.
109. Id. at 326.
110. Id.
111. EEOC v. General Electric Co., 532 E2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976) (confirming EEOC's pur-
pose is broader in scope than interests of charging parties); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91
F.3d 1529 (2nd Cir. 1996) (stating EEOC is authorized to pursue action against employer for vio-
lating ADEA even where no individual claimant exists); EEOC v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 80 F.3d
449 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (confirming the EEOC's authority to conduct an investigation into alleged
discrimination in the absence of a valid charge of discrimination); EEOC v. United Parcel Ser-
12
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when the EEOC's statutory authority was questioned. However, as was the
case in Waffle House, a question remained which concerned how the Supreme
Court would resolve the conflict that existed between the strong federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration and the EEOC's well-recognized authority.
C. The Circuits Attempt to Resolve the Conflict
1. EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co."'
In 1992, the EEOC filed suit against Kidder for alleged violations of the
ADEA. 1"3 It claimed that the company was in the practice of terminating its
older employees on the basis of their age." 4 The EEOC originally sought
back pay, liquidated damages, reinstatement, and injunctive relief."5 However,
in late 1994, Kidder had discontinued its investment banking operations, and
as a result, the EEOC stipulated that it would no longer be seeking injunctive
relief." 6 The EEOC continued to seek back-pay and liquidated damages on
behalf of nine of the original seventeen people terminated by Kidder.'
As part of their employment agreement with Kidder, the former employ-
ees had signed an arbitration clause."' Once the EEOC stipulated that it
would no longer seek injunctive relief, Kidder sought to dismiss the Commis-
sion's claim on the ground that the signed arbitration agreements precluded
the EEOC from seeking back-pay and liquidated damages." 9' The district
court granted the motion, 120 and the EEOC appealed.' 2'
In a case of first impression, the Second Circuit considered how a signed
arbitration agreement should affect the EEOC's authority to enforce discrimi-
vice, 860 F.3d 372 (10th Cir. 1988) (EEOC had standing by itself to challenge employer's "no
beard" policy).
112. 156 F.3d 298 (2nd Cir. 1998).





118. Kidder, 156 F.3d at 300. As part of the clause, the employees "agreed to submit any
and all claims arising out of their employment with Kidder to binding arbitration." Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The district court based its holding on the Gilmer decision, stating that to allow
the EEOC to seek monetary damages in federal court would frustrate the federal policy favoring
arbitration under the FAA due to there being a signed arbitration agreement. Id.
121. Id.
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natory employment practices and seek all available relief. The court ulti-
mately affirmed the decision of the lower court and found that the EEOC was
precluded from seeking monetary damages in federal court when a signed ar-
bitration agreement existed. 2  The Second Circuit came to its decision by
aligning its reasoning with that of the Gilmer decision. 12 In its analysis, the
court reiterated the Supreme Court's statement that arbitration agreements
would not preclude the EEOC from seeking class-wide or injunctive relief.'24
Further, it cited the Ninth Circuit, stating that when the EEOC seeks injunc-
tive relief, "'[it] promotes the public policy and seeks to vindicate rights be-
longing to the United States as sovereign."" 25 However, where an "individ-
ual has contracted away, waived or unsuccessfully litigated a claim, 'the
public interest in a back pay award is minimal.'"126 Finally, the Second Cir-
cuit applied the weighing standard utilized by the Ninth Circuit to the arbitra-
tion agreement involved in Kidder, and found that the EEOC's pursuit of
monetary damages alone had a minimal effect on advancing the public inter-
est.'27 Ultimately, the Second Circuit's decision set the stage for the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Waffle House, in that it found for bifurcating the forums,
depending upon the type of remedy sought.'28
2. EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc. 29
While the Second and Fourth Circuits agreed on how to resolve the
competing policy interests between the EEOC and the FAA, the Sixth Circuit
did not, and created a split with its decision. Frank's Nursery involved an Af-
rican American, Carol Adams, who was allegedly passed over for a promo-
tion because of her race.' 30 Adams subsequently filed suit with the EEOC,
122. Id. at 303.
123. Id. at 301.
124. Kidder, 156 F.3d at 301. Most notably, the court cited to a line of cases that held an
individual's settlement or waiver of a claim under the ADEA preempted a subsequent EEOC ac-
tion on that claim seeking damages for the individual.
125. Id. at 302. (quoting EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1543
(1987).
126. Id. (quoting Goodyear, 813 F.2d at 1543).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 303. The court found that compelling the claimant to arbitrate his monetary
damages claim did not take away the EEOC's mission to further the public interest, or take away
the deterrent effect monetary damages serve. Id. However, Judge Feinberg, in his concurring
opinion, set the stage for a circuit split regarding the issue. The main thrust of his argument cen-
tered on concerns about whether ADEA rights could be adequately vindicated at arbitration. Id.
at 304.
129. 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
130. Id. at 453.
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who ultimately brought the Title VII claim for unlawful business practices.' 3'
As part of its complaint, the EEOC sought injunction and "make-whole" re-
lief which included back-pay and compensatory and punitive damages. 32
Following the complaint, Frank's moved to compel arbitration pursuant
to the FAA and in accordance with the signed arbitration agreement. 3 3 The
district court found for Frank's and dismissed the EEOC's complaint in its
entirety.'3 It based its decision on three conclusions. First, the found the arbi-
tration agreement was enforceable under Gilmer. 35 Second, the EEOC was
bound by Adams' agreement to arbitrate. 36 Third, while the EEOC could sue
for injunctive relief generally, it could not in this case because it had not
identified a class of individuals that suffered discrimination at Frank's. 37 The
EEOC subsequently appealed to the Sixth Circuit.'38
In its appeal, the EEOC challenged only two of the district court's find-
ings, First, the EEOC argued that the Adams' agreement to arbitrate did not
preclude the EEOC from recovering monetary damages.13' Second, the EEOC
argued that it should not be barred from seeking injunctive relief against
Frank's. 40 The court began its analysis by examining the Title VII statute.
The court recognized that there were very few limitations imposed on the
EEOC's power to file suit in federal court.' 4' The Sixth Circuit distinguished
between the EEOC filing a suit itself in order to advance the public interest
131. Id. The precise complaint alleged that Frank's (1) bypassed Adams for promotion be-
cause of her race; and (2) required Adams and other applicants to sign and abide by an applica-
tion that conditioned employment on waiving statutory rights afforded them by Title VII. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 453-54.
134. Id. at 454.
135. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 454.
136. Id.
137. Id. Because only Adams filed a suit with the EEOC, the lower court held that there




141. Frank's Nursery, 177 F.3d at 455. The court then went to great lengths to evidence
the EEOC's authority over Title VH claims. During the 180 period after filing suit, the EEOC re-
tains "exclusive' jurisdiction over the subject matter of the charge." Id. (citing General Tele-
phone, 446 U.S. 318). The individual claimant can only intervene in the action once the EEOC
accepts it. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1998)). Also, the individual claimant may not
withdraw his claim absent the EEOC's permission. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.10 (1998)). In
sum, an individual may not take away the EEOC's enforcement powers under Title VII.
15
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and cases where the agency permits the individual to file suit.142 In the latter
instance, the EEOC issues a "right to sue" letter to the employee.14 Thus, as
evidenced in Title VII itself, Congress intended the EEOC to have an inde-
pendent right to sue separately from the individual's. Therefore, to allow the
individual to contract away the EEOC's right to do that which it was intended
to do would effectively strip it of its congressional purpose.' 44
Finally, the court dealt with the issue of the EEOC's request for mone-
tary damages. 45 The court's argument concerning the EEOC's ability to seek
monetary damages reflected its earlier contention concerning the EEOC's au-
thority to bring Adams' claim in federal court. Because the EEOC was not a
party to the arbitration agreement, it was not bound by it.' 46 Furthermore, the
EEOC possessed an independent right to bring its claim in federal court as
well as the authority to decide whether or not the claim should be brought at
all. 147 Thus, the court reasoned, the individual claimant could not divest the
EEOC of its right to seek monetary damages nor could she override the
EEOC's congressional power to sue in its own name.
48
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
On June 23, 1994, Eric Baker entered a Waffle House restaurant in Co-
lumbia, South Carolina. 149 As part of the employment application, Mr. Baker
was required to agree to an arbitration clause. ' ° Immediately subsequent to
submitting his application, Mr. Baker walked into a second Waffle House in
West Columbia, South Carolina and spoke to its manager. 5' The West Co-
lumbia manager subsequently interviewed Mr. Baker and hired him. 152 Mr.
Baker began work as a grill operator on August 10, 1994.113
Sixteen days after he began work for Waffle House, Mr. Baker suffered a
142. Id. at 456.
143. Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (b) (explaining the process for issuing a right to sue
letter by the EEOC).
144. Frank's Nursery, 177 F3d at 458-59.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 460.
147. Id. at 466.
148. Id.
149. EEOC v. Waffle House, 193 F.3d 805, 807 (41h Cir. 1999).
150. Id. The clause stated that "any dispute or claim concerning Applicant's employment
with Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or Franchisee of Waffle House, Inc., or the terms,
conditions or benefits of such employment" had to submit to binding arbitration. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
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seizure at his home, 5 4 likely due to a change in medication prescribed to con-
trol the seizures.' 55 After arriving to work the following day, Mr. Baker suf-
fered a second seizure. 5 6 He was promptly terminated on September 5,
1994.1'7
Following the termination, Mr. Baker filed a timely action with the
EEOC, stating that his discharge violated the ADA. 58 After an investigation
and attempt at conciliation, the EEOC filed an action against Waffle House in
the Federal District Court for the District of South Carolina. 59 The complaint
alleged that Waffle House had terminated Mr. Baker based on his disability,
that the violation of the ADA was intentional, and "done with malice or
reckless indifference to [his] federally protected rights."' 6
In response to the EEOC's complaint, Waffle House sought to compel
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and stay the EEOC from
litigating its claim in federal court. 16' The district court found in favor of the
EEOC regarding its preclusion in federal court, 62 and Waffle House appealed
to the Fourth Circuit. 63 The Fourth Circuit ultimately found for two distinct
154. Id.
155. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 807.
156. Id.
157. Id. In the separation notice, Waffle House stated, "We decided that for [Baker's] ben-
efit and safety and Waffle House it would be best he not work any more." Id.
158. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
159. Id. The EEOC filed its action pursuant to both the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (a) and
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a). Id.
160. Id. Specifically, the EEOC sought as relief "(1) a permanent injunction barring Waf-
fle House from engaging in employment practices that discriminate on the basis of disability; (2)
an order that Waffle House institute and carry out antidiscrimination policies, practices, and pro-
grams to create opportunities and to eradicate the effects of past and present discrimination on
the basis of disability; (3) back pay .and reinstatement for [Mr.] Baker; (4) compensation for pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary losses suffered by [Mr.] Baker; and (5) punitive damages." Waffle
House, 194 F.3d at 807.
161. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 284.
162. Id. The district court denied each of Waffle House's motions, holding that the arbitra-
tion provision that Mr. Baker signed as part of his employment contract was inapplicable because
he never signed it pursuant to employment at the West Columbia Waffle House, who ultimately
hired and terminated him. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 808.
163. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 284. On appeal, Waffle House argued that "(I) a valid, en-
forceable arbitration agreement existed between [Mr.] Baker and Waffle House, and (2) its mo-
tion to compel arbitration under § 4 of the FAA should be granted because the arbitration agree-
ment between [Mr.] Baker and Waffle House binds the EEOC to 'assert [Mr.] Baker's claim in
an arbitral forum."' Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 808.
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holdings. First, the court concluded that the agreement did not involve the
EEOC, and thus, the EEOC possessed the independent statutory authority to
bring its action in federal court.' 64 However, the court precluded the EEOC
from seeking victim-specific relief in federal court, in an effort to give some
effect to Mr. Baker's signed arbitration agreement.'65 Thus, while the EEOC
could seek injunctive relief in federal court, make-whole relief remained sub-
ject to an arbitrator's decision. Due to the conflict among the circuit courts
that have considered this very issue, 16 6 the Supreme Court granted certiorari 67
to put an end to the confusion. 168
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice Stevens's Majority Opinion
The Court framed the issue as "whether an agreement between an em-
ployer and an employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes bars the
[EEOC] from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief, such as back pay, rein-
statement, and damages, in an enforcement action alleging that the employer
has violated Title I of the [ADA]."1 69 In an effort to answer this question, the
Court began with an examination of the EEOC's statutory authority as stipu-
lated by Title VII. 70 It cited to the amendments of the original Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as being an express empowerment of the EEOC to seek mone-
tary relief.'7 ' Additionally, the Court recognized the 1991 amendments which
allowed for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.'72 As such,
the Court acknowledged the clarity of the EEOC's authority to seek monetary
damages such as those sought in the instant case.'73
164. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 284.
165. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated, "When the EEOC seeks 'make-whole' relief for a
charging party, the federal policy favoring enforcement of private arbitration agreements out-
weighs the EEOC's right to proceed in federal court because in that circumstance, the EEOC's
public interest is minimal .... " Id. (quoting Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812).
166. Supra notes 112-148.
167. 532 U.S. 941 (2001).
168. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 285.
169. Id. at 282.
170. Id. at 285. The Court stated that the purpose behind the EEOC's creation was "to ex-
ercise the same enforcement powers, remedies, and procedures that are set forth in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it is enforcing the ADA's prohibitions against employment
discrimination on the basis of disability." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (a) (1994)).
171. Id. at 286. Damages include "injunctions; appropriate affirmative action; equitable re-
lief; accrual of back pay; reduction of back pay; limitations on judicial orders." Id. n. 5 (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(I) (1994)).
172. Id. at 287. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(l) (1994)).
173. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 287.
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The second line of argument that the Court utilized in its examination,
was the EEOC's independent authority to bring a discrimination claim in fed-
eral court.174 The Court cited to its prior decisions in General Telephone and
Occidental, where it refused to place limitations on the EEOC which would
have been placed on an individual claimant. 175 The Court's reasoning, which
it extended to the instant case, was that the "EEOC does not function simply
as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of parties.' 76 Finally, the
Court stated that while Congress expressly expanded the EEOC's authority
with the 1991 amendments, there was no language to suggest that these abili-
ties were to be limited by the existence of an arbitration agreement.'77
After examining the EEOC and its statutory authority, the Court went on
to discuss the FAA and its purpose. 78 It quoted to section two of the FAA,
stating that a contract evidencing an arbitration agreement was presumptively
valid. 79 However, under the FAA (as with any contract), the intent of the par-
ties must control.' 80 Ultimately, the FAA does not mention enforcement by
public agencies and does not control a nonparty's choice of forum. 8 '
In the next section of its analysis, the Court directly attacked the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning. 82 In sum, it disagreed with the court's implementation of
the Second and Ninth Circuit's public policy balancing test. 83 The Court
made clear that it was the EEOC's right as a public agency to decide what
relief was appropriate and what would serve the public interest, not the indi-
vidual claimant, and not the court.'" Further, once the EEOC decided what
174. Id.
175. Id. For a more detailed examination of the Court's decisions in these cases, see supra,
notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
176. Id. at 287-88. (quoting Occidental, 432 U.S. at 368).
177. Id. at 288.
178. Id. at 289.
179. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289.
180. Id. "[T]he FAA's proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes
of the contracting parties." Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57.
181. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289.
182. Id. at 290.
183. Id. The Court stated that this framework assumes that, unless the EEOC's remedies
are limited, the FAA will suffer. However, some benefits of arbitration are already built into the
EEOC's statutory scheme. Examples of this are that the EEOC has essentially attempted to re-
solve the conflict outside of a judicial setting already as party of its mandated conciliation pro-
cess. Id. at n. 7. For a more complete discussion of this balancing test, see supra, notes 125-127
and accompanying text.
184. Id. at 291-92.
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relief was to be sought, it possessed the statutory right to seek it in federal
court.185 Thus, any attempt made by a court to decide what relief served what
public policy would be in violation of the EEOC's enforcement scheme.
In an attempt to further strengthen its opinion, the Court took aim at re-
futing several arguments relied upon by both the Respondent and Justice
Thomas in his dissent.8 6 Both Respondent and Justice Thomas claimed that
the language of Title VII supported the Fourth Circuit's decision because it
limited the EEOC's possible recovery to that which was "appropriate" as de-
termined by the court.'87 Thus, according to the dissent, the court, not the
EEOC, is to determine what type of remedy is appropriate.'88 The Court
found this reasoning flawed for two reasons. First, the term "appropriate"
only applied to the subcategory of equitable relief claims.'89 The allowance of
compensatory or punitive damages was not covered by the language. 9
The dissent also stated that the term "may recover" in the statute gov-
erning punitive and compensatory damages also prohibited victim-specific re-
lief. 191 This led the Court to its second criticism of its opposition's reasoning.
Under the plain reading of the language, the judge is allowed to determine
which remedies are required at an ad hoc, case by case basis. 9 E If the rule
were applied according to the Respondent's interpretation however, it would
amount to a categorical limitation on the expressly authorized remedies avail-
able to a claimant who has signed an arbitration agreement. 93
The Court next focused on the Fourth Circuit's balancing test ap-
proach. 94 While the majority acknowledged Congress' calling in the enact-
185. Id. at 292.
186. For a more detailed examination of Justice Thomas' dissent, see infra notes 210-257
and accompanying text.
187. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 292. After the court finds liability, "[it] may enjoin the re-
spondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of em-
ployees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (1994)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Punitive and compensatory damages are governed by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(l) (1994).
191. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 292. "... the complaining party may recover compensa-
tory and punitive damages .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(l) (emphasis added).
192. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 292-93.
193. Id. at 293. The Court was quick to point out that while Justice Thomas recognized
this distinction, the Court of Appeals did not. It made it an absolute rule that the EEOC could
not seek victim-specific damages in federal court under any circumstances. Id. at n. 8. See also
Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812.
194. Id. For a description of the Fourth Circuit's test, see supra note 166.
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ment of the FAA, 95 it correctly instructed that the FAA did not require par-
ties to arbitrate who were not parties to the contract. 19 6 Accordingly, the
EEOC was not bound by Mr. Baker's agreement to arbitrate. 9 7
The Court further stated that the Court of Appeals' division between in-
junctive relief and victim-specific relief was an "uncomfortable fit with its
avowed purpose of preserving the EEOC's public function while favoring ar-
bitration."' 9 As a persuasive example, the Court stated that while punitive
damages often serve a greater function of deterrence than personal relief, 199
they would be unattainable under the Fourth Circuit's balancing test.200 On the
other hand, the test relegates injunctive relief to broad-based public interest,
while it serves a "victim-specific" function as well. 20' Thus, as the Court
stated, "the category of victim-specific relief is both overinclusive and under-
inclusive" in its definition.20 2
The Court concluded its examination of the issue by stating that the
Fourth Circuit's balancing test transforms a forum selection clause into a
waiver of a nonparty's congressionally granted rights.203 However, if the fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration trumps the clear authority of the EEOC, the
Commission should be barred from seeking any relief in the event an arbitra-
tion clause exists. 20 4 Ultimately, the Court held that whenever the EEOC
chooses to file an action against an employer, the Commission may seek to
vindicate the public interest by pursuing all types of relief granted it by
statute.2 05
195. The purpose of the FAA was to place arbitration agreements on equal footing as other
contracts. Id. at 294.
196. Id. (quoting Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n. 12 (1967) (.'[T]he purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitra-
tion agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so"').
197. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 294-95. The Court pointed to its decision in Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
where it stated, "Punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured
party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor . and to deter him and others from similar extreme
conduct." 452 U.S. 247, 266-270 (1981).
200. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 295.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 294.
203. Id. at 295.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 295-96.
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As a follow-up to its holding, the Court examined what effect Mr. Baker
may have on the EEOC, should he decide to accept a settlement or refuse to
mitigate his damages. 2°6 The Court's response was a cautioned one, stating
that this behavior may have an effect on the EEOC and the relief it may ob-
tain in court.207 Further, the Court was explicit in evidencing its aversion to a
court granting double recovery to an individual claimant.2 8 Still, because
none of these possibilities occurred in the instant case, there was nothing lim-
iting the EEOC's available remedies.2°9
B. Justice Thomas's Dissenting Opinion (joined by the Chief Justice and Jus-
tice Scalia)
The dissenting opinion can essentially be broken up into three different
sections. First, Justice Thomas questioned whether the EEOC had the author-
ity to decide what damages were appropriate in any given case.2 10 Second, the
dissent analyzed whether it would be appropriate to award the EEOC victim-
specific relief on behalf of Mr. Baker.21 Finally, Justice Thomas concluded
with a discussion of the practical implications of the Court's decision, and his
recommendation to the Court.212
1. Who decides damages?
Justice Thomas began by questioning the EEOC's statutory authority.
According to the dissent, the EEOC sought victim-specific relief for which
Mr. Baker could not have sought for himself.213 The dissent explained that
Mr. Baker had signed away the ability to bring a claim against Waffle House
in court, or to receive relief in such a forum. 214 Further, the EEOC stated that
all relief received would be done so directly by Mr. Baker, and that their rep-
resentation was on behalf of Mr. Baker." 5 Thus, because Mr. Baker waived
206. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 296-97.
207. Id. at 297.
208. Id. (quoting General Telephone, 446 U.S. at 333).
209. Id. The Court was very hesitant to limit the EEOC's authority to seek any remedy it
chose to. The majority made clear that the EEOC did not act merely as a proxy for the individ-
ual, and its statutory authority granted it the sole authority over its choice of charges. Id. This re-
luctance seemed to open the door to questions concerning the EEOC's authority over previously
arbitrated claims, and similar circumstances.
210. See infra notes 213-219 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 220-249 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 250-257 and accompanying text.
213. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 300.
214. Id. at 299-300. The Court did not dispute that the arbitration agreement fell under the
FAA. Id.
215. Id. at 300. The EEOC stated in their responses to interrogatories and directives that,
22
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his ability to bring suit in court, and because the EEOC was admittedly act-
ing on behalf of Mr. Baker, the Court was allowing the EEOC to do for Mr.
Baker what he could not do for himself. 1 6
The dissent's next step was to refute the majority's justification for al-
lowing the EEOC to seek victim-specific relief on behalf of Mr. Baker. While
the Court believed the EEOC's statutory authority to be clear regarding reme-
dies, Justice Thomas disagreed. Though the EEOC had the right to bring suit,
it lacked the authority to obtain a particular remedy."7 Only a court had the
discretion to choose which remedy was "appropriate." 2"8 Further, if Congress
had wished to grant the EEOC the ability to decide what type of damages to
seek, it would have done so.21 9 Thus, Justice Thomas believed the limitation
on the EEOC's seeking of remedies to be clear.
2. Is victim-specific relief appropriate?
The second issue that the dissent focused on was whether it would be
appropriate for a court to allow the EEOC to seek victim-specific relief on
behalf of Mr. Baker. 2 0 Justice Thomas stated that the victim-specific relief
lacked appropriateness for two reasons.22' First, The EEOC must take its
claimant as it finds them. 2 2 Mr. Baker signed an agreement to arbitrate any
claim arising out of his employment with Waffle House. Justice Thomas be-
lieved this to limit the EEOC's enforcement of Mr. Baker's claim, in a man-
"All amounts recovered from Defendant Employer in its litigation will be received directly by
Mr. Baker based on his charge of discrimination against Defendant Employer." Id.
216. Id. at 300.
217. Id. at 301.
218. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l)). He stated, "it is a court's role to decide
whether 'to enjoin the respondent .... and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."' Waffle House, 534
U.S. at 301. For a detailed examination of the Court's response to Justice Thomas' "appropriate-
ness" argument, see supra, notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
219. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 302. The dissent examined both the House and Senate ver-
sions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. While the original versions granted the
EEOC the authority to both prosecute a claim and implement a remedy, the final version only al-
lowed the EEOC the ability to adjudicate a claim in court. Id. at 302-03. (citing H.R. 1746, 92d
Cong., Is' Sess., § 706(h) (1971) and S. 2515, 92d Cong., IP Sess., § 4(h) (1971)).
220. Id. at 303-04.
221. Id. at 304.
222. Id.
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ner similar to a prior settlement or a refusal to mitigate damages.223 Because
Mr. Baker waived his right to bring a lawsuit in a judicial forum, so should
the EEOC have had to lose that right.224
In response to the dissent's argument, the majority correctly stated that
the EEOC's claim is not "merely derivative" of the individual claimant's.225
However, Justice Thomas believed the issue was not whether the EEOC
"stands in the employee's shoes, '22 6 but whether the EEOC's ability to obtain
relief is in any way dependent on the employee's ability to do so.227 Once
Justice Thomas altered the issue, he quickly did away with the Court's sup-
porting precedent.22
Justice Thomas spent significant time debunking the Court's cited prece-
dent, General Telephone and Occidental.22 9 In its examination of General
Telephone, the dissent stated that nothing in the decision would allow the
EEOC to seek relief which the claimant could obtain for himself.3 0 Further,
the dual roles which the EEOC occupies do not suggest that the EEOC aids
the public interest in seeking victim-specific relief."'
In response to the majority's use of the Occidental decision as support,
Justice Thomas criticized the Court's analysis and how it related to the instant
case.232 To begin, by precluding the EEOC from seeking victim-specific relief
223. Id. at 304-05 (citing Ford Motor. Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-232 (1982). For
examples of other ways a private claimant could limit the EEOC's enforcement abilities, see
EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1091 (5th Cir. 1987); Goodyear, 813 F.2d at 1543 (9th
Cir. 1987); EEOC v. Harris Chemin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993).
224. Id. at 305.
225. Id.
226. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 305.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 306. The majority cited to Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), General Telephone, 446
U.S. 318, and Occidental, 432 U.S. 355 as support for its notion that the EEOC does not act
merely as a proxy for litigation for the individual claimant.
229. Justice Thomas quickly addressed the majority's use of Gilmer. While the Gilmer
Court stated that an arbitration agreement would not preclude the EEOC from bringing a claim in
court, it said nothing of whether the EEOC could seek victim-specific relief on behalf of an em-
ployee who had previously signed an arbitration agreement. Id. at 306 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
32). For a detailed examination of the Gilmer decision, see supra notes 52-69 and accompanying
text.
230. Id. at 306-07. Supra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
231. Id. When the EEOC exercises its statutory authority, it does so to personally vindi-
cate the charging party, and to vindicate the public interest inherent in employment discrimina-
tion. Id. See also EEOC Compliance Manual N:2346. In the note material, Justice Thomas recog-
nized the deterrent effect monetary damages possessed. Id. at 307 n. 10. However, he essentially
adopted the balancing test of the Second Circuit, by claiming that the public interest is best vin-
dicated when injunctive relief is sought, not victim-specific relief. Id. at 307.
232. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 307-08.
24
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in litigation, the Court would still be allowing for the discharge of the
EEOC's administrative duties under its enforcement scheme.233 Additionally,
arbitration would allow for what Justice Thomas believed to be the underly-
ing policy of Occidental: "that employment discrimination claims should be
resolved quickly and out of court. ' 23 4 Thus, the dissent believed it had suffi-
ciently refuted the Court's use of the above-mentioned cases, while maintain-
ing the integrity and purpose of the EEOC.
The second reason given by the dissent for why it would be inappropri-
ate for the EEOC to seek victim-specific damages is that it would contravene
the strong federal policy favoring arbitration. 35 Justice Thomas began by evi-
dencing the validity of Mr. Baker's arbitration agreement under the FAA. 236
Here, the dissent reformulated the issue by asking whether the Court should
allow the EEOC to seek monetary damages in federal court, thereby reducing
the arbitration agreement to a nullity.2 37 Justice Thomas believed the FAA de-
manded a negative response to this question. 238
According to Justice Thomas, under the majority's ruling, the EEOC is
allowed to "eviscerate" the arbitration agreement and rescue Mr. Baker from
its limitations.23 9 Further, not only would the Court's ruling harm Waffle
House because of its having to defend itself in federal court, it also open
Waffle House up to defending itself in both court and arbitration. 240 This dual
defense would then create prospect of double recovery.24' This possibility was
found in the Court's refusal to decide whether a prior arbitral judgment would
233. Id. at 308. In Occidental, the Court cited a statute of limitations as limiting the
EEOC's ability to discharge its administrative duties. Supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
234. id. (quoting Occidental, 432 U.S. at 368). The dissent seemed to lose the forest in the
trees with its critical analysis of these cases. While the specific contours of each case may be up
for debate as to how they relate to the instant case, the over-arching purpose of both General
Telephone and Occidental was to release the EEOC from the same limitations that bind individ-
ual plaintiffs. This was done with the realization that the EEOC seeks both an individual remedy
and a public one.
235. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24).
236. Id. (citing to Part I of the dissent; supra note 214).
237. Id. at 308-09.
238. Id. at 309.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 309-10. "[E]mployees will be allowed two bites at the apple - one in arbitra-
tion and one in litigation conducted by the EEOC - and will be able to benefit from the more
favorable of the two rulings." Id. at 310.
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affect the EEOC's ability to seek relief in federal court.2 42 However, the dis-
sent believed the handwriting was on the wall due the majority's emphasis
that the EEOC is the "master of its own case. ' 243 Due to the Court's analy-
sis, the dissent found it hard to believe that an individual's prior arbitration
could in any way affect the EEOC's independent authority over the matter.244
The logical conclusion, therefore, placed the employer at a serious disadvan-
tage and would be contrary to the federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments under the FAA.2 45
Justice Thomas concluded his dissent by summarizing his position. Ulti-
mately, the Court's decision has no logical stopping point.246 Under the
Court's analysis, a prior settlement by the individual claimant would not
render the EEOC's action moot, nor would it preclude them from seeking
broad-based relief.247 Further, there was nothing in the decision to suggest
that the EEOC could be barred from seeking victim-specific relief in the event
of a prior settlement.248 Thus, the dissent believed that the Court's ruling will
discourage employers from trying to settle cases at all, fearing a later decision
in favor of the EEOC.249
3. The dissent's recommendations
Following its criticism of the majority opinion, the dissent gave its own
recommendations. Justice Thomas believed that the EEOC's statutory author-
ity under the ADA could be reconciled with the FAA. 250 Instead of placing
the FAA in a position subordinate to the ADA, Congress stated explicitly that
arbitration was encouraged under the ADA.25' The dissent took issue with the
EEOC's belief that agreements to arbitrate were enforceable only when it was
242. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 309. See also supra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
243. Id. at 310. See also supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
244. Id. If an individual claimant's actions could affect the EEOC's authority, it would cre-
ate a discrepancy in the Court's feeling that the EEOC is "the master of its own case."
245. Id.
246. Id. at 311.
247. Id. Of course, if the EEOC settles its own claim with an employer, than mootness
principles apply. Id.
248. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 311. However, the dissent did state that it may be possible
that a prior settlement by the individual claimant could limit the EEOC's ability to seek victim-
specific damages. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 313. This is important because courts "are not at liberty to pick and choose
when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly ex-
pressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective." Id. (quoting Pitts-
burgh & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 491 U.S. 490, 510 (1989)).
251. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994)).
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not involved. 252 Nowhere in the EEOC's statutory scheme is this limiting
principle articulated. 253 Finally, the dissent found no indication that Congress
intended the EEOC to undermine enforceable arbitration agreements.254
Justice Thomas concluded by recognizing the inherent conflict between
the Court's prior decisions favoring arbitration under the FAA and the instant
case. 255 While he did not specifically endorse the Court's prior opinions, Jus-
tice Thomas saw no reason why that pattern should not continue here.256 Ulti-
mately, the dissent's conclusion found that the majority's decision was rooted
in the idea that employment discrimination claims were to be treated differ-
ently than arbitration in other contexts. 2 7
V. THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
The Court's decision in Waffle House was a surprising one, due to its
break from a long line of precedent.5 While this case can be distinguished
from earlier cases due to the direct involvement of the EEOC, the practical
effects of the decision will ultimately highlight this divergence. Due to the
unanswered questions left by the Court, the only way to resolve Waffle House
with the Court's past decisions may be to question the adequacy of arbitration
itself as a forum for the vindication of discrimination claims.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas recognized some of the
problems inherent in the Court's decision.259 The first of these considered
what was to become of the signed arbitration agreement? 26° This is quite pos-
252. Id. at 314.
253. Id.
254. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 314.
255. Id.
256. Id. "The Court should not impose the FAA upon States in the absence of any indica-
tion that Congress intended such a result (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 456 U.S. 1, at 25-
30 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)), yet refuse to interpret a federal statute in a manner com-
patible with the FAA." Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 314-15.
257. Id. at 315. As the dissent noted, this policy is directly contrary to the Court's decision
in Gilmer, which found that arbitration agreements under the ADEA could be enforced without
concern for "important social policies." Id. (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28).
258. For an examination of this precedent, see supra notes 40-69 and accompanying text.
That precedent had continued through 2001 with Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105, 123 (stating that arbitration agreements under the FAA can be enforced without contraven-
ing the policies granted employees to protect them against discrimination).
259. Supra notes 210-257 and accompanying text.
260. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 309.
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sibly the most important question created by the Court's decision because of
its practical consequences. While the decision will ultimately influence few
cases,26' it still seems to place the legitimacy of arbitration agreements at the
discretion of the EEOC. The Court stated that the FAA is "at bottom a policy
guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements. 2 62 How-
ever, it is reasonable to believe that if an employee does not wish to arbitrate
his discrimination claim, he now possesses the possibility of having the
EEOC litigate it in federal court. If this were true, then the private contractual
arrangement would be nullified. If not, then an entirely different problem
would be raised.
As the dissent noted, there was nothing in the opinion to suggest that
double recovery would not be possible under the Court's reasoning.2 63 While
the Court expressed a distaste for double recovery,2 64 if the EEOC is truly the
"master of its own case," then there is no reason to think that there is any
action which an individual claimant could take to limit the EEOC's authority
over the matter. Not only would this place the employer in a precarious posi-
tion, it would further discourage him from utilizing an arbitration agreement.
In its decision, the Court refused to recognize a conflict between the
EEOC's statutory scheme and arbitration agreements under the FAA. It
merely stated that, because the EEOC was not a party to the agreement, it
was not bound to arbitrate. 65 Additionally, under its scheme, the EEOC has
the authority to control its own case.2 66 While both of these justifications are
accurate, the Court should also have considered whether allowing a non-party
to effectively nullify a perfectly valid contract is consistent with the FAA. As
such, it seems a different question should be raised; what is to be gained
from the EEOC's involvement in Mr. Baker's claim? The Court balked at ad-
261. Backlog is already a problem for the EEOC as the numbers of employment discrimi-
nation claims continue to rise. Julie W. Waters, Does the Battle Over Mandatory Arbitration
Jeopardize the EEOC's War In Fighting Workplace Discrimination, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1155,
1156 (2000) (citing Evan J. Spelfogel, Mandatory Arbitration vs. Employment Litigation, 54
DISP. RES. J. 78 (1999)). In 2000, the EEOC received 79, 896 charges of employment discrimi-
nation, and found reasonable cause in 8,248 of them. However, it filed only 291 lawsuits, or
3.5% of claims found to be supported by reasonable cause. Waffle House, 122 S.Ct. at 754 n.7.
(citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation http://
www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2001)).
262. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625) (emphasis
added).
263. Id. at 309-10.
264. Id. at 297.
265. Id. at 290.
266. Id. at 288.
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dressing this question, and it necessitates looking to Congress's intent behind
the creation of the EEOC.
In enacting the employment discrimination statutes, such as the ADA,
Congress sought to put an end to workplace discrimination. 267 Further, the
Court stated that the federal courts were entrusted with the primary jurisdic-
tion over these matters.2 68 It is clear, as evidenced by the Court, that Congress
intended employment discrimination claims to be dealt with in the federal
courts. This intent was made manifest in the creation of the EEOC.2 69 The
reason for this may be found in the inadequacies that are inherent in the use
of arbitration as a forum for hearing discrimination claims. 70 Since Gilmer,
several circuits have held, for varying reasons, that arbitration is not proper in
the discrimination context.27' However, these are all issues that the Court left
unresolved. It is likely, though, that the Court will have the opportunity to
examine these questions in future cases.
267. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Comp., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995).
268. Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982).
269. The Court has stated that the EEOC is authorized under Title VII to bring actions
against employers in federal court. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 363.
270. The EEOC has largely rejected the use of mandatory arbitration agreements due to its
possibilities for bias against employees and its lack of precedent-making decisions. First, because
the employer acts as a source of future income for the arbitrator, and because the employer has
more experience in the forum, arbitration can prove to be bias in favor of employers. Excerpts
from Text: EEOC Rejects Mandatory Binding Employment Arbitration, 52 DISP. RES. J. 11, 13
(1997) (hereinafter referred to as "Excerpts"). Additionally, arbitrator's have "no general charter
to administer justice for a community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system
of self-government created by and confined to the parties .... " Id. at 12 (citing United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960) (citation omitted)).
Further, because arbitration decisions are not required to be written or reasoned, they are not
public, and as such, are neither precedential nor open to public debate. Excerpts at 12-13.
271. Cole, 105 F.3d 1465 (DC Cir. 1997) (discouraging arbitration absent procedural safe-
guards); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Comp., 144 E3d 1182, 1190 (9 h Cir. 1998) (holding
that mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements violate the congressional intent behind the
ADA and Title VII); Prudential Insurance Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (91h Cir., 1994)
(rejecting an arbitration agreement because the claimant did not knowingly waive her ability to
bring her claim to trial); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1, 20-21
(Is Cir. 1999) (holding that arbitration cannot be compelled when not "appropriate" under lan-
guage of Title VII).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Waffle House, while relatively unexpected, was
appropriate. As the Court stated, the EEOC's ability to bring employment dis-
crimination claims in federal court was clear. As such, the case stands for the
EEOC's continued authority over these matters, and their ability to enforce
their statutory scheme has been assured. However, the decision also marks a
slight contraction of the Court's formerly broad policy favoring the enforce-
ment of private arbitration agreements.
While the facts of Waffle House were distinct from the Court's past deci-
sions involving arbitration agreements, its holding does call some formerly
well-recognized conclusions regarding such agreements into doubt. The en-
forceability of future arbitration agreements and the overall adequacy of the
forum are uncertain. Furthermore, the decision may signal a trend that retreats
from the general acceptance felt for mandatory arbitration agreements in
every context. However, the ultimate effect of Waffle House should be the re-
alization that the only way to resolve the workplace discrimination statutes
with the FAA is to find that the two were never meant to interact. As such,
the decision may evidence the Court's recognition that employment discrimi-
nation claims were considered by Congress to be different from other claims,
and should be treated accordingly.
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